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Resultant Luck and Criminal Liability 
Andrew Cornford 
 
Introduction 
 
The causation of harm is an important factor in criminal liability, both as a ground for and as 
an object of it. That a person has acted in a certain way, or omitted to act in certain 
circumstances, is important in how the state will treat them as an offender, but it is not 
conclusive. The nature and extent of criminal conviction and punishment often rest on the 
harms that these actions and omissions bring about. Thus, in English law, the person who 
intentionally punches another and bruises his cheek will be guilty of assault, whilst the person 
who intentionally punches another and kills him, no matter how unwillingly, will be guilty of 
manslaughter.1 This practice is so familiar that we rarely stop to question it. Indeed, in 
informal discussions of crimes, it is likely to be harm that predominates. For example, we 
would tend to say that the alleged manslaughterer is on trial for killing his victim, rather than 
for intentionally performing some unlawful and dangerous act that happened to cause the 
victim’s death. 
 However, on reflection, criminal liability for resulting harm raises some troubling 
philosophical questions. In particular, it seems to be an instance of the problematic 
phenomenon known to moral philosophers as moral luck. Formally, moral luck occurs when 
the moral blame or judgement that is due to an agent can be influenced by factors outside of 
that agent’s full control. If moral luck is ever ‘true’ – that is, if it ever occurs legitimately – 
then, as Thomas Nagel points out, it seems to present us with a paradox in our conception of 
morality. This is because morality is often thought, for reasons of fairness, to be subject to a 
control principle: that is, that the moral judgement or blame that is due to agents ought only 
to be influenced by factors that are within those agents’ control.2 
                                                 
 School of Law, University of Warwick. I am grateful to the editors and to the participants in the Stirling 
workshop for all their input. Particular thanks are due to Alan Norrie, Dan Priel, Massimo Renzo and Victor 
Tadros for their more detailed comments, and to Vera Bergelson for her comments as my respondent. 
1 Newbury and Jones [1977] AC 500 HL. 
2 See generally ‘Moral Luck’ in T Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979). 
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 To illustrate the significance of this problem, consider the following example. Imagine 
first that a person is driving her car at 60 miles per hour through a residential area with narrow 
streets. This driver approaches a blind corner. She fails to slow down sufficiently and, as a 
result, mounts the kerb on the outside of the corner as she goes round it. Unfortunately, a 
pedestrian is walking down the footpath just as the driver goes round the corner. The car is 
travelling fast enough to kill the pedestrian instantly. Now imagine a variation of this case in 
which the same driver acts in exactly the same way: she drives through the same area at the 
same speed, fails to slow down in time for the same corner and mounts the same kerb. 
However, this time there is nobody on the footpath. Nobody is hurt and the driver reaches 
her destination safely. 
 Resulting harm would influence this driver’s criminal liability in English law. In the first 
place, she would be liable for different offences depending on the harm that she causes. 
Whilst she would be guilty of dangerous driving in the harmless second case, she would be 
guilty of causing death by dangerous driving in the first.3 In turn, since the driver would be 
liable for different criminal offences, she would also be liable to different levels of 
punishment. Dangerous driving carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment, whilst 
the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving is 14 years.4 
 The element of moral luck in this example consists in the fact that the driver lacks full 
control over the results of her actions. Certainly, as Nagel points out, it is intuitively plausible 
that whether or not the driver kills should influence the moral blame that is due to her.5 
However, the control principle is also plausible: we tend to adjust our moral judgements as 
we learn the various ways in which they are incompatible with it.6 From the driver’s internal 
perspective, the above cases are identical: her deliberations and volitions are the same 
whether or not she does harm. The fact that she encounters a pedestrian is (one might think) 
purely a matter of luck.7 Thus, if one subscribes to the control principle, one will think it unfair 
that harm should influence her criminal liability.  
                                                 
3 Road Traffic Act 1988 ss 1 and 2, as amended. 
4 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 sch 2 part 1, as amended. 
5 Nagel (n 2 above) 29-31. 
6 Ibid 27. 
7 Some dispute the use of the word ‘luck’ in this context, since its ordinary usage implies abnormality as well as 
a lack of control: see e.g. MU Coyne, ‘Moral Luck?’ (1985) 19 Journal of Value Inquiry 319, 321-322; K Levy, 
‘The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful Action that 
Causes It’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 263, 278-279; M Moore, ‘The Independent Moral Significance of 
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 The type of moral luck on display in this case is often called resultant luck, because it 
is the results of the agent’s actions that make the (putative) difference to the moral blame or 
judgement that is due to her. Whilst there are other forms of moral luck, I will only discuss 
resultant luck in this paper.8 Since criminal conviction and punishment are public forms of 
blame and censure, we should expect them to be subject, in at least some degree, to the 
ordinary conditions of moral judgement. However, as we have already seen, it can seem 
unfair on reflection that results should affect moral judgement or blame, because agents lack 
full control over their occurrence. Thus, criminal law incorporates the problem of resultant 
moral luck. Given the importance of resulting harm as a factor in criminal liability, this 
potentially poses a significant problem for the justice of the criminal law. 
 In this paper, I do not pretend to offer another attempted ‘solution’ to the moral luck 
problem. Given the troubling questions that this phenomenon raises about moral agency and 
responsibility, their objects and conditions, I am sceptical that the problem can satisfactorily 
be solved.9 However, I believe that it can be made much less daunting – at least in the context 
of resultant luck – if we identify more precisely wherein the problem lies. That is my aim in 
the first part of this paper. I will argue that, by distinguishing different senses of moral 
judgement and blame and the various ways in which results might affect these, the scope of 
the resultant luck problem is significantly narrowed. I will further argue that our intuitive 
reactions in resultant luck cases – which are often used to support the existence of true 
resultant moral luck – in fact only support, on their most plausible construction, a very 
different kind of resultant luck to the one that Nagel imagines. 
 In the second and third parts of the paper, I turn to the question of what influence 
resultant luck should have in the specific institutional context of the criminal law. I begin in 
part two by arguing that harm can properly be a part of what the state communicates about 
specific criminal acts. To illustrate this, I consider the significance of resulting harm from three 
                                                 
Wrongdoing’ (1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 237, 254-256. Nothing in this paper turns on the 
use of the word ‘luck’. 
8 The other kinds of moral luck that Nagel identifies are constitutive luck, circumstantial luck and ‘luck in how 
one is determined by antecedent causes’: (n 2 above) 32-35. The problems presented by these forms of moral 
luck are distinct from those presented by resultant luck, mostly reflecting more familiar problems of the 
compatibility of causal determinism with traditional conceptions of moral responsibility.  
9 For example, what kind or level of control is required for moral agency? And why should we judge that 
people are morally responsible for consequences at all? In this paper, I assume (justifiably or otherwise) that 
there is some satisfactory answer to this second question. Suffice it to say for now that our morality (and, 
indeed, our self-understanding more generally) would look very different without this practice. 
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perspectives: those of offenders, victims and the general public. I then go on in part three to 
provisionally explore the practical consequences of this significance for particular 
determinants of criminal liability. I argue that resulting harm might properly influence how 
criminal offences are defined and conceivably even decisions to criminalise conduct in the 
first instance. However, the legitimate extent of its influence will depend on a number of 
variable countervailing factors. 
 
1. Clarifying the Problem 
 
Resultant moral luck is problematic because it reveals the apparent incompatibility of two 
intuitively appealing principles in our conception of morality. On the one hand, it seems 
plausible that harm should affect moral judgement and blame. On the other, it seems 
plausible that these should only be sensitive to factors that are within agents’ full control. To 
resolve this paradox, it may seem necessary to jettison one principle or the other. However, 
the simple statement of the problem introduced above conceals several important 
ambiguities. For example, what do we mean by ‘moral judgement and blame’? And precisely 
what kind of influence over these do we intuitively allow to resulting harm? Detailed answers 
to these questions will help us to better understand the resultant luck problem. 
 
A. Moral Judgement and Blame 
 
There are many different kinds of moral judgement that we might make about agents or their 
actions, including judgements about their blameworthiness. Despite employing similar 
terminology, such judgements can have quite distinct targets. For instance, consider two 
judgements that we might make about the case of the reckless drivers, introduced above. On 
the one hand, it seems that the driver who kills and the driver who is merely reckless are 
equally morally blameworthy. As we saw, these agents’ actions are the same from their 
internal point of view; thus, it seems absurd to regard one as more morally culpable than the 
other. On the other hand, however, it seems that greater blame is appropriate in the case of 
the driver who kills. Unlike the merely reckless driver, the driver who kills is responsible for a 
death. As such, we might say that she is more blameworthy, because she is to blame for more. 
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 Judith Thomson shows how we can explain these kinds of apparently paradoxical 
statements about resultant luck cases by distinguishing different meanings of the word 
‘blame’ in moral discussion.10 The first meaning Thomson identifies can be seen in the thought 
that the two drivers are equally blameworthy, because they are equally morally culpable. We 
might call this the culpability sense of blameworthiness. A person is blameworthy in the 
culpability sense when some action of his gives us reason to think badly of him. It is this sense 
of moral blameworthiness that informs the thought that there is no material difference 
between the two drivers: since their deliberations and volitions are identical, the fact that 
one driver has caused harm gives us no extra reason to think badly of her.11 Indeed, it would 
be absurd if resultant luck were to influence judgements of this kind. The mere causation of 
harm gives us no reason to think badly of agents, other than as evidence of why their actions 
might have been wrongful in the first instance. 
 The second meaning of ‘blame’ that Thomson identifies can be seen in the thought 
that the two drivers are differently blameworthy, because only one is responsible for causing 
harm. We might call this the attribution sense of blameworthiness. A person is blameworthy 
in the attribution sense to the extent they are responsible for bringing about some 
unwelcome outcome, or are responsible for doing something which is unwelcome in itself. In 
this sense, the driver who kills is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver because 
only she is to blame for a death.12 By contrast to judgements of blameworthiness in the 
culpability sense, we would obviously expect judgements of attribution blameworthiness to 
be sensitive to resultant luck. We clearly cannot judge which outcomes agents are responsible 
for without asking what the results of those agents’ actions were. 
 An important feature of both the attribution and culpability senses of 
blameworthiness is that they are simply a function of moral facts about agents and their 
actions. It is unsurprising that harm only influences judgements of attribution, for harm does 
not make a difference to how we should judge agents qua agents. Indeed, hardly anyone 
                                                 
10 ‘Morality and Bad Luck’ (1989) 20 Metaphilosophy 203. Others make similar distinctions: for example, 
between ‘scope’ and ‘degree’ of responsibility (M Zimmerman, ‘Taking Luck Seriously’ (2002) 99 Journal of 
Philosophy 553); between liability to blame and ‘being responsible’ for one’s actions (J Andre, ‘Nagel, Williams 
and Moral Luck’ (1983) 43 Analysis 202, 205); between ‘verdictive’ judgements of blameworthiness and the 
appropriateness of blaming actions (H Jensen, ‘Morality and Luck’ (1984) 59 Philosophy 323).  
11 ‘Morality and Bad Luck’ (ibid) 209-211. 
12 Ibid 208-209. 
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argues directly against this position.13 However, the idea that some kind of control principle 
should apply to judgements of culpability is entirely compatible with the idea that harm 
should influence judgements of attribution. That some consequence is attributable to an 
agent is, again, simply a judgement about another kind of moral fact. There is thus nothing 
paradoxical in claiming that more bad consequences are attributable to the driver who kills, 
whilst also claiming that the two drivers are equally morally culpable. 
 This distinction between different senses of blameworthiness may help to alleviate 
some of the perplexity that the resultant luck problem has caused to criminal lawyers. The 
debate over whether harm ought to influence criminal liability often seems irresolvable 
because it is framed as an argument about ‘desert’.14 Since the entire substance of this 
disagreement is whether or not harm affects desert, there seems to be little possibility of 
progress if the various parties simply base their positions on contrary intuitions. However, 
progress would be enabled if reflection were invited on the different kinds of moral blame 
that might influence legal liability. For example, one might reconstruct the belief that harm 
should not affect desert as a belief that criminal liability should only track culpability. Against 
this, one might argue that criminal conviction could properly reflect resulting harm without 
violating the control principle, for whilst it gives an account of attributable harms, it does not 
carry any implication that the person whose actions cause harm is more culpable than the 
person whose actions do not. 
 Such a relocation of the debate about the proper place of harm within criminal liability 
also highlights the truly problematic aspect of resultant moral luck. Judgements of culpability 
and attribution are simply judgements about moral facts. By contrast, the practices of criminal 
liability are blaming actions with potential negative consequences for those to whom they are 
directed. As such, they call for independent justification. Of course, one might still think that 
there are simple cases here. For example, one might think that the occurrence of harm entails 
an entitlement to act indignantly towards those who cause it, simply as a corollary of the fact 
that the harm is attributable to them.15 Whether or not we accept this, however, the cases of 
                                                 
13 Margaret Urban Walker at least appears to: see ‘Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency’ (1991) 22 
Metaphilosophy 14. However, she does not distinguish between different senses of moral blameworthiness as 
I suggest here that we should. 
14 For example, Michael Moore believes that harm affects desert (‘The Independent Moral Significance of 
Wrongdoing’ (1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 237), whilst Larry Alexander and Kimberley Ferzan 
believe that it does not (Crime and Culpability (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) chs 2 and 5). 
15 See e.g. M Otsuka, ‘Moral Luck: Optional, Not Brute’ (2009) 23 Philosophical Perspectives 373. 
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criminal conviction and punishment are surely not this simple. Criminal conviction involves 
public stigmatisation, whilst punishment involves the deliberate infliction of substantial 
deprivations. We should seek positive reasons for allowing the occurrence of harm to 
influence these practices. 
 I return to this issue in part 2 below. For now, we need only note that defining blame 
more clearly locates the resultant luck problem more precisely. In particular, we should note 
that there can be no inherent objection to attributing harms to people who cause them, for 
we have no reason to apply a control principle to this kind of judgement. It follows from this 
that there can be no inherent objection to the state convicting harm-doers of different 
offences to similarly culpable non-harm-doers. The material question is instead whether, all 
things considered, the state is justified in doing so. 
 
B. The Intuitive Significance of Harm 
 
Since the blaming practices of the criminal law potentially have negative consequences for 
those to whom they are directed, they require independent justification. As we have already 
seen, it seems intuitively plausible that the occurrence of harm should have at least some 
influence in this context. This intuitive response may be seen to provide compelling evidence 
of the existence of true resultant moral luck. However, as is so often the case with such 
intuitive responses, the precise content and motivation of this feeling is ambiguous. Must it 
really be construed as a feeling about the appropriateness of greater punishment or 
resentment? Or is it best understood as a feeling about something else entirely?16 
 Some obvious but important points are worth making about the psychological 
pressures that act on our intuitive responses to resultant luck cases. First, consider the 
motivation for anger that the occurrence of harm gives us. This motivation is quite 
independent from that generated by wrongful action alone. Certainly, we could probably 
expect to feel some kind of anger when we hear about the actions of the merely reckless 
driver. However, the driver who hits and kills a pedestrian has actually brought an undesirable 
                                                 
16 I assume here that the best explanation of particular intuitive judgements is the one that can best be 
reconciled with our other, rational judgements and with our intuitive commitments as a whole. For an 
alternative approach – deriving a set of moral ‘first principles’ from our intuitive judgements about resultant 
luck cases – see Moore (n 14 above). 
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circumstance into being. Given this, we are more likely to feel angry with this driver, and to a 
greater degree. Doubtless this will often be accompanied by a greater urge for retribution, 
especially if we have any kind of emotional attachment to the victim. 
 However, these retributive urges that the occurrence of harm tends to activate surely 
should not be taken to express any intuitions about justice or the appropriateness of moral 
blame. To illustrate this, consider first how these retributive urges are altered by emotional 
detachment from a case. If we have no attachment to the victim, any desire for retribution 
will likely be less strong and may not even be present at all.17 Conversely, consider how we 
would react to those cases where we have an attachment to a specific person, who narrowly 
avoids being harmed by another person. For instance, say that our reckless driver mounts the 
kerb and misses a close friend of yours by a matter of inches. Here your reaction will more 
closely resemble your reaction to the case in which your friend is hit and harmed.18 
 Additionally, those retributive urges that we retain are often mitigated on reflection. 
As we acquire greater appreciation of the facts of a given case, our attitudes towards it are 
likely to change. For instance, the culpability of the driver who kills will be immediately 
obvious; by contrast, we may not appreciate how dangerous the merely reckless driver’s 
actions were until it is pointed out to us. Once we learn how fast she was driving and where, 
that she took a blind corner without slowing down sufficiently and so forth, we will appreciate 
how easily someone could have been hurt and adjust our judgements accordingly. Again, the 
converse case illustrates the same point: imagine how we would react if we found out that 
the driver who killed the pedestrian did nothing more dangerous than travel a few miles per 
hour too fast through a residential area, as many drivers do every day. Then we may be 
inclined to think that ‘it could have happened to anyone’.19 
 These observations suggest that our intuitions about how we should react to people 
who do wrong are not related to the harm that they cause in any simple way. Such a 
relationship, if it exists, is likely to be more complex. One famous attempt to explain it can be 
found in Bernard Williams’ essay on moral luck.20 Williams argues that people can be expected 
to feel a special kind of remorse for those harms that they cause, even when they cause them 
                                                 
17 R Parker, ‘Blame, Punishment and the Role of Result’ (1984) 21 American Philosophical Quarterly 269, 273. 
18 Ibid 274. 
19 J Andre, ‘Nagel, Williams and Moral Luck’ (1983) 43 Analysis 202, 203-204. 
20 ‘Moral Luck’ in B Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: CUP, 1981). 
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entirely non-culpably.21 As we have seen, we can expect people to develop a degree of critical 
detachment from such cases. However, surely even the most reflective and dispassionate 
observer would think something amiss if a driver who killed a pedestrian, even quite 
accidentally, simply shrugged it off as ‘a matter of luck’.22 Rather, since this driver brought the 
harm about, we would expect them to feel remorseful about what they have done. 
 Williams calls this special kind of remorse agent-regret. Whilst agent-regret is a 
notoriously difficult idea to pin down precisely, Williams is clear about some aspects of it. For 
instance, he is clear that it is distinguishable from both general regret and the desire to have 
done otherwise than one did. Indeed, it is compatible with being glad, all things considered, 
to have done as one did. Rather, Williams eventually seems to settle on the idea that agent-
regret is characterised by a desire to think better next time: to learn something from the 
experience that can inform future deliberations.23 He is not clear on exactly how the 
appearance of agent-regret supports his conclusion that resultant moral luck is probably 
unavoidable. However, the clearest route to this conclusion seems to be that agent-regret is 
somehow uniquely obligatory for those who cause harm, and that we are justified in reacting 
differently towards harm-doers as a result of this. 
 There are several problems with using agent-regret as a way of linking resultant luck 
to our intuitive beliefs about the appropriateness of moral blame or judgement. First, why 
should those harms that are brought about entirely non-culpably prompt a resolution to 
‘think better next time’? Certainly, one might properly feel remorseful for having been in a 
position (albeit unwittingly) to avoid causing the relevant harm. However, this simply follows 
from the fact that it is good to be compassionate: to care about others’ wellbeing and to feel 
bad when one avoidably harms them. It would be irrational to think that one’s deliberations 
should have been better than they were if they were not faulty.24 Indeed, one surely cannot 
be culpable in any degree for causing harm unless one had reason to know that one’s actions 
carried a risk of causing that harm. As Nagel points out, there is nothing truly ‘moral’ about 
resultant luck unless it has this dimension.25 
                                                 
21 Ibid 28. 
22 MU Walker, ‘Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency’ (1991) 22 Metaphilosophy 14, 19. 
23 Williams (n 20 above) 28-33. 
24 D Enoch and A Marmor, ‘The Case against Moral Luck’ (2007) 26 Law and Philosophy 405, 420. 
25 ‘Moral Luck’ in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979) 19. 
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 Moreover, if deliberative failure is the object of agent-regret, then it would be 
appropriate even when no harm is caused. ‘Thinking better next time’ is a fitting resolution in 
respect of any morally faulty action, whatever its consequences.26 Doubtless, it is true that 
the occurrence of harm is in fact more likely to prompt such a resolution than its non-
occurrence. However, this is insufficient to prove a necessary connection between harm and 
agent-regret. To illustrate, consider again the case of the reckless driver who narrowly misses 
a specific pedestrian. In this situation, the risks of harm associated with that driver’s actions 
are clearly revealed. Thus, she is likely to revise her plans about how to drive in future, even 
though she has done no harm. 
 Additionally, the examples that Williams uses to support his argument are defective, 
because they leave open how far the agents concerned can justifiably regard themselves as 
being non-culpable for the harms that their actions caused.27 For instance, one important case 
for Williams’ argument concerns a truck driver who kills a child that jumps out in front of his 
vehicle.28 Perhaps we might expect this truck driver to question his own fallibility: did he really 
do everything that he could reasonably have done to avoid hitting the child? However, this 
feeling is not related to the appropriateness of blame, of whatever kind. If we ourselves are 
convinced of the truck driver’s moral innocence, we surely would not oblige him to feel regret 
simply because he happened to have a certain kind of causal connection to the child’s death.29 
 All of this suggests that our intuitions about the appropriateness of agent-regret are 
insufficient to support any commitment to resultant luck in our blaming practices. However, 
perhaps they are sufficient to support another kind of moral luck. After all, we surely retain 
the intuition that even the completely non-culpable actor who causes harm has a certain kind 
of special relationship with their victim after the fact. They are not like a mere bystander, 
even a bystander who was particularly proximate to the event: they caused the harm, 
however innocently. As we have already pointed out, we might think such a person callous if 
they felt no regret at all. More than this, however, many will think that they now owe certain 
duties to the person that they harmed that they did not owe before. For example, it is 
                                                 
26 Joel Feinberg makes a similar point to this. We can rightly feel morally guilty whenever we do wrong, 
including in those cases where our wrongful conduct makes no mark on the world: see ‘Equal Punishment for 
Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments Against It’ (1995) 37 Arizona L Rev 117, 128. 
27 Enoch and Marmor (n 24 above) 418-419. 
28 Williams (n 20 above) 28. 
29 B Rosebury, ‘Moral Responsibility and “Moral Luck”’ (1995) 104 Philosophical Review 499, 515-516. 
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plausible that they have a duty to apologise for causing that harm.30 Additionally, we might 
think that, all else being equal, those who cause harm should compensate their victims for 
the damage that is attributable to them. 
 The plausibility of such duties as apology and compensation suggests that we do have 
an intuitive commitment to a certain kind of resultant moral luck: namely, that the results of 
our actions can influence our moral obligations. However, we should not overestimate the 
significance of this finding. In the first instance, we should not be too surprised that the 
appearance of these duties is a matter of luck, since our everyday moral duties often arise in 
ways that are outside of our full control. For example, we cannot determine when our friends 
might need our help, or whether our unborn children might have medical conditions that will 
generate particularly stringent duties to provide for them.31 
 Moreover, this kind of resultant luck is not ‘moral’ luck as defined by Nagel and 
Williams. Whilst it is plausible that resultant luck might influence our moral obligations, this 
says nothing of any intuitive commitments about the appropriateness of moral judgement or 
blame. Neither does it say anything about the appropriateness of agent-regret. Certainly, the 
person who causes harm, no matter how innocently, may properly regret acting as they did. 
However, the occurrence of harm by itself gives them no cause to regret deliberating as they 
did, unless that harm was itself the result of faulty deliberation. Indeed, in many cases of 
innocently-caused harm – Williams’ truck driver case is probably one – it will scarcely be 
appropriate to say that the actor is an agent of that harm at all. Rather, one is more like an 
instrument through which the harm was brought about.32 Doubtless it is a deeply unpleasant 
feeling to have been instrumental in the occurrence of some terrible harm. However, this 
again reveals no intuitive commitment to using resulting harm as a basis of moral judgement 
or blame. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Of course, such an apology would amount to a mere expression of regret, without the usual 
acknowledgement of moral culpability. 
31 MU Walker, ‘Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency’ (1991) 22 Metaphilosophy 14, 24. 
32 Rosebury (n 29 above). 
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2. The Significance of Harm 
 
We can draw two conclusions from this clarification of the resultant luck problem. First, whilst 
our blaming actions and their potential negative consequences stand in need of independent 
justification, there is nothing inherently wrong with attributing to agents the harms that they 
have caused. Second, whilst it is plausible that agents’ moral obligations are altered by their 
having caused harm, the best construction of our intuitions does not support the subjection 
of our blaming practices to resultant luck. I turn now to consider whether, in light of these 
conclusions, the state has good reason to make resulting harm a target of criminal liability. I 
will argue that recognising the communicative function of the criminal law leads to a positive 
answer to this question. However, before I turn to this argument, I wish to briefly dismiss two 
alternative lines of thought that have also been thought to justify criminal liability for resulting 
harm.33 
 The first of these is the epistemic limitations view. According to this view, the limited 
nature of the state’s knowledge about offenders’ mental states – and thus also their moral 
culpability – justifies treating harm-doers differently from non-harm-doers. Given such 
limitations, the occurrence of harm provides prima facie evidence of moral culpability of a 
kind that is not available when no harm is done.34 This argument also has a normative 
dimension: acquiring further evidence about offenders’ mental states would require 
undesirable levels of scrutiny, amounting to an unjust invasion of privacy.  According to some 
advocates of this view, our moral integrity as a whole would be damaged if such interference 
were permitted, given the excessive blaming that would occur if all culpable people were 
punished to the full extent of their desert.35 In light of these concerns, the epistemic 
limitations view holds that it is preferable for a system of ‘social morality’ such as the criminal 
law to be grounded in resulting harm, as a ‘proxy’ for moral culpability.36 
 This first line of argument fails because its premises are false. In the first place, whilst 
it is true that the occurrence of harm provides evidence of culpability, it is only one kind of 
                                                 
33 Moore convincingly rejects a number of less well-developed arguments: see ‘The Independent Moral 
Significance of Wrongdoing’ (1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 237, 241-252. 
34 See e.g. N Richards, ‘Luck and Desert’ (1986) 65 Mind 198; D Enoch and A Marmor, ‘The Case against Moral 
Luck’ (2007) 26 Law and Philosophy 405, 415. 
35 See e.g. H Jensen, ‘Morality and Luck’ (1984) 59 Philosophy 323. 
36 Rosebury (n 29 above) 522. ‘Social morality’ is Moore’s phrase (n 33 above). 
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available evidence. Others will often be present. For instance, consider again the case of the 
two reckless drivers: here, the culpability of the merely reckless driver can be inferred from 
clearly visible aspects of her conduct, even though she has not caused harm. The concern that 
the investigation of culpability would create unjust invasions of privacy is also unjustified. The 
ascription of mens rea (or ‘guilty mind’) is already an established part of criminal law; it is a 
long way from holding people responsible for ‘thought crimes’.37 Correspondingly, applying 
the same blaming practices to non-harm-doers as to harm-doers does not seem likely to 
damage our moral integrity. Certainly, it would be excessive if the state were to subject 
people to blame every time they did wrong. However, the same is surely not true if the state 
takes blaming action only against those whose conduct may legitimately be criminalised in 
the first instance. 
 A second common way of justifying the imposition of criminal liability for resulting 
harm is the voluntary assumption of responsibility view. This line of argument holds that, in 
acting wrongfully, we voluntarily accept liability for any negative consequences that result. 
There have been various expressions of this argument, all couched in diverse terminology. 
However, they rely on a common idea: namely, that there is something significant about 
voluntary wrongful action such that, when we engage in it, we change our own moral position 
in a way that leaves our liability open to the effects of resultant luck.38 This argument is often 
supported by an analogy with gambling. When we act wrongfully, it is like spinning a roulette 
wheel at a casino. By voluntarily performing such an act, we subject our desert to luck: we are 
licensed to act in our uncertain world and to reap the rewards when we ‘win’, but only on the 
condition that we accept the burdens when we ‘lose’.39 
 This line of argument is also unsuccessful, because it begs the question. The conclusion 
that resultant luck can properly influence criminal liability only follows because it is assumed 
that voluntary wrongful action entails accepting responsibility for those consequences that 
flow from it. No advocate of this view offers any reason to accept this assumption. The 
                                                 
37 Moore (n 33 above) 247. 
38 See e.g. J Gardner, ‘On the General Part of the Criminal Law’ in his Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in 
the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007); B Herman, ‘Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts’ (1995) 
37 Arizona L Rev 143; J Horder, ‘A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law’ [1995] Crim LR 
759; K Levy, ‘The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful 
Action that Causes It’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 263; M Otsuka, ‘Moral Luck: Optional, Not Brute’ (2009) 
23 Philosophical Perspectives 373. 
39 AM Honoré, ‘Responsibility and Luck: the Moral Basis of Strict Liability’ in his Responsibility and Fault 
(Oxford: Hart, 1999). 
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gambling analogy is also a distraction. Certainly, acting wrongly is like placing a bet, in that 
the outcome of such actions is in fact a matter of luck. However, it is only like placing a bet. 
All else being equal, gamblers freely consent to subject their desert to luck. What is more, the 
element of luck provides part of the putative value of gambling. Neither of these statements 
is true of criminal liability, whose practices cannot be ‘opted into’. This is not to deny that we 
may nevertheless be able to find some independent reason to impose criminal liability for 
resulting harm: indeed, I will argue below that we can. However, if we are to take this path, 
then there is no need for the ‘voluntary assumption of responsibility’ device in the first place. 
 These brief remarks suggest that we will need to improve on previous efforts if we 
wish to justify imposing criminal liability for resulting harm. As I have already stated, my 
preferred alternative is a justification based on the communicative function of the criminal 
law. It is familiar enough that the criminal law has this function.40 Besides aiming to prevent 
future harms, it plays an important expressive role: it provides the moral voice of the political 
community, reinforcing that community’s norms and condemning infringements of them. I 
suggest, however, that the communicative content of the criminal law can legitimately go 
beyond these familiar terms. Because of its role as the political community’s principal moral 
institution, the criminal law has reason to account for a range of morally significant facts 
about the events that it deals with, including resulting harm. To illustrate this, I will consider 
three groups for whom communications about harm may properly be morally significant: 
offenders, victims and the general public. 
 Consider first the significance of harm for offenders. Antony Duff has sought to explain 
criminal liability for resulting harm from this perspective, particularly as a way of 
communicating the appropriateness of either relief or regret on an offender’s part.41 Duff 
observes that only those offenders who have caused harm have actually brought some 
tangible evil into being and thus fully made their mark on the world as ‘criminal agents’. Those 
offenders who have not caused harm correspondingly lack this status, which generates a 
reason for relief.42 By contrast, where an offender’s actions result in harm, he has no grounds 
for feeling relieved. Instead, regret and remorse are appropriate: both for having brought the 
harm about and for the faulty deliberations that led him to act as he did. By making criminal 
                                                 
40 V Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2005) ch 3. 
41 ‘Auctions, Lotteries and the Punishment of Attempts’ (1990) 9 Law and Philosophy 1. 
42 Ibid 35. 
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liability sensitive to harm, the state communicates these facts to offenders. It reminds those 
offenders who have caused harm of the regrettable consequences of their wrongful actions, 
whilst those offenders who have not caused harm are reminded of the consequences that 
their actions could have had.43 
 One might doubt that this line of thought provides a particularly strong reason to 
impose criminal liability for resulting harm. Ultimately, the aim of inducing either relief or 
regret is surely the same: namely, to produce an emotional response in offenders that will 
prompt them to realise the error of their ways. However, as we saw in part 1 above, it is 
plausible that causing harm has more significant moral implications for offenders than this. In 
particular, it might entail that their moral duties are altered: for example, they may acquire 
duties to apologise to or compensate their victims. This is not to say that the state should 
enforce such duties (at least through the criminal law): indeed, there may be persuasive 
reasons against this.44 However, such duties are surely morally significant, and by imposing 
criminal liability for resulting harm, the state can at least confirm that they are owed.  
 These claims are admittedly open to disagreement. After all, I merely demonstrated 
above that the idea that harm alters our moral duties is intuitively plausible; I did not present 
an argument for this conclusion. Indeed, advocates of the control principle will probably argue 
that this intuition simply provides further evidence of the unthinking, retributive tendency to 
attach too great an importance to harm in our moral judgements of agents and their actions. 
These duties could instead be more sensitive to culpability: for example, we might demand 
that all culpable people contribute to compensating the injured. Given the uncertain 
foundations of the duty to compensate, it will be best to avoid this controversy for the 
moment.45 It will suffice to note that these revisionist arguments are not currently widely 
accepted. Many will still be receptive to the idea that causing harm alters our moral duties, 
and thus also to the idea that criminal liability for resulting harm communicates something of 
moral significance for offenders. 
                                                 
43 As Duff puts it: ‘you tried to harm this person but, thank God, you failed’ (ibid 36-37). We might equally put 
it: ‘you endangered this person but, thank God, you did not harm them’. 
44 For example, it may be that forced apologies are of less value than those freely given. 
45 To illustrate, see the following for three very different perspectives on the philosophical foundations of 
compensation: Honoré (n 39 above); N MacCormick, ‘The Obligation of Reparation’ in his Legal Right and 
Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); EJ Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995) chs 3-5. 
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 Nevertheless, it will be worthwhile to devote greater attention to the significance of 
harm for victims and the public, for there is greater potential for convergence in these areas. 
Let us turn first to the significance of harm for victims. To state that resulting harm is 
significant for victims of crime is obvious; however, it is also important, for it highlights the 
way in which those cases in which harm is caused are most dramatically different from those 
in which no harm is caused. In contrast to the offender context, an advocate of the control 
principle could not reasonably expect to tell a victim who has suffered harm that they should 
care only about culpability. Whilst a system of criminal prohibitions generally serves to 
protect that victim’s interests, those interests have only been interfered with in fact if the 
victim has suffered harm.46 Indeed, from the victim’s perspective, that they have suffered 
harm is probably the most significant fact that the criminal law could communicate about 
‘their’ case. 
 Does the significance of harm for victims give the state good reason to account for 
that harm in its communications? Here is a strong reason to think that it does. As we just 
noted, the substantive criminal law generally serves to affirm the moral claims of citizens. 
However, the state has an additional reason to re-affirm the moral claims of those who have 
actually become victims of crime. This arises from the moral humiliation that is characteristic 
of feelings of victimhood: the demeaning of one’s moral worth that is inherent in unjustified 
injury to one’s interests. Because those who experience this feeling have been made to doubt 
the value of their moral claims, the state has a reason to confirm publicly the significance of 
their interests specifically. Making harm an object of criminal liability is one way in which the 
state can achieve this, because doing so acknowledges that the harm that the victim has 
suffered is worth reporting, as well as the culpable behaviour of the offender. 
 Of course, the category of people who have suffered such moral humiliation does not 
coincide perfectly with the category of those who have suffered harm. As I will explore further 
in part three below, criminal acts can have specific victims even when they do not result in 
harm, thus giving the state a similar reason to re-affirm the moral claims of specific persons. 
However, as a matter of psychological fact, the characteristic feelings of victimhood are 
inevitably at their strongest when a victim’s primary interests have actually been interfered 
with. Thus, even if one does not agree that the need to re-affirm specific moral claims 
                                                 
46 This is not to deny that we have an interest in our primary interests not being endangered; however, the 
value of this interest derives from the value of the relevant primary interests. 
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militates strongly in favour of criminal liability for resulting harm, one can still agree that harm 
is a worthy object of state communication. By acknowledging the significance of harm, the 
state acknowledges the significance of victims, because what matters to them is seen to 
matter to the political community as a whole. 
 Approached from this perspective, one can see that taking account of harm in the 
practices of the criminal law is plausibly even a matter of justice. Certainly, the primary role 
of the criminal justice system lies in what it does to offenders: catching them, calling them to 
account for their actions, condemning and punishing them for what they have done wrong, 
attempting to prevent them from doing wrong again. However, as a social institution – 
especially one with a role as the moral voice of the political community – the criminal justice 
system owes a duty of fair treatment to all citizens.47 A criminal law grounded only in volition, 
of the kind that some commentators propose,48 may do best at accounting for the offender 
perspective, but it would leave little room for other important facts about criminal cases. 
Given that there is no inherent moral restriction on attributing harm to offenders, the state 
thus has good reason to acknowledge harm. As we will see below, other considerations might 
sometimes defeat this. However, not accounting for the victim perspective at all is unfair and 
thus – in the context of a public system with this unique moral role – unjust. 
 I appreciate that this line of argument may prove troublesome for criminal law theory, 
given its traditional focus on criminal law’s ‘general part’ – the doctrines of which serve almost 
entirely to make sense of the offender perspective on criminal action. Given the primary 
function of the criminal justice system as outlined above, doubters may wonder whether the 
victim perspective has any proper role within it, save an evidential one. They may worry that, 
by adopting this perspective, we risk going too far: say, by giving victims a say in the fate of 
offenders.49 Certainly we should guard against such a possibility. However, we can distinguish 
(at least in principle) between the objective moral significance of harm to victims and those 
same victims’ unreasoned retributive desires. ‘Justice for victims’ of the kind that I am urging 
here need not involve giving effect to the latter. Rather, I simply argue that we are morally 
                                                 
47 As Rawls famously opined, justice is ‘the first virtue of social institutions’: A Theory of Justice (rev edn, 
Oxford: OUP, 1999) 3. 
48 See e.g. L Alexander and K Ferzan, Crime and Culpability (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
49 The controversy surrounding the use of victim impact statements in sentencing decisions illustrates these 
concerns: see A Ashworth, ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ [1993] Crim LR 498. 
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entitled to attribute harms to offenders, and that the significance of harm to victims gives us 
reason to do so. 
 Similar things can be said about the significance of harm in the criminal law’s 
communications to the general public. To illustrate, consider how harm might influence our 
reaction to the case of the dangerous driver. Whilst we will be angry upon hearing of the case 
in which no harm is caused, the case in which the pedestrian is killed will provoke additional 
responses: for example, sympathy for the victim’s family, indignation at his undeserved 
suffering or sadness at the loss of his future. Such reactions are uniquely appropriate to the 
case in which harm occurs. We may even wish to encourage them as expressions of fellow 
feeling, and therefore important foundational elements of our sense of justice.50 Again, this 
is not to deny that there might also be undesirable reactions that we ought not to give effect 
to; the negative influence of retributive public sentiment on criminal justice policy is familiar 
enough. However, recognising the ways in which harm is reasonably a matter of public 
importance need not involve this. 
 To understand why the public has a legitimate interest in communications of this kind, 
we must once again look to the moral role of the criminal law in public life. Crimes are often 
distinguished as public wrongs: they interfere with values which are shared or protected by 
the political community.51 However, the criminal law is also public in nature because its 
practices are public. When people are charged with a criminal offence, they are called to 
answer to their fellow citizens, in the name of their fellow citizens.52 In systems where criminal 
cases are tried by jury, it may also be their fellow citizens who pass judgement on them. 
Crimes are thus ‘public’ in the sense that their prosecution and punishment is carried out by 
the state, in our name. Because of this, we have a stake in how the practices of criminal justice 
are carried out, as well as the substantive contents of the criminal law. Again, this suggests 
that the state has reason to look beyond the culpability of offenders in determining what and 
how to communicate through the criminal justice process. So long as we are morally 
permitted to attribute harms to offenders, the demands of fairness to each citizen suggest 
that we may also be justified in doing so. 
                                                 
50 Rawls (n 47 above) s 71. 
51 Compare RA Duff and SE Marshall, ‘Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs’ (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 7; G Lamond, ‘What is a Crime?’ (2007) 27 OJLS 609. 
52 RA Duff, Answering for Crime (Oxford: Hart, 2007) ch 2. 
19 
 
 This further contributes to explaining what would be absurd about a criminal law that 
imposed liability only for volitions. It would seem odd – perhaps even offensive – for the state 
to act as if there were nothing materially different about cases in which harm occurs from 
cases in which it does not. To better understand this, we can consider a specific aspect of 
criminal law that would be different under a volition-based system. For example, imagine that 
the state began convicting people who kill intentionally not of murder but of ‘acting with 
intent to kill’. Imagine further the trial of a person accused of this offence, when that person 
had succeeded in killing. Part of what we would find odd about such a spectacle is doubtless 
that it would differ greatly from what we are accustomed to. However, the greater part of the 
absurdity lies in the use of a criminal court – the foremost moral forum of our political 
community – to discuss a series of events whilst deliberately ignoring a morally significant 
aspect of them. Given the public nature of criminal justice, this would effectively amount to 
a wrongful denial of the significance of harm to us.  
 
3. How Harm Should Influence Criminal Liability 
 
All of this suggests that the state has good reason to make criminal liability sensitive to 
resulting harm. Given that there can be no inherent moral objection to attributing harm to 
those who have caused it, criminal liability for resulting harm is therefore justifiable in the 
absence of competing considerations. In this final section, I will discuss precisely how harm 
should influence criminal liability. Due to constraints of space, this discussion will be 
generalised and undesirably brief. What follows should therefore be understood as 
preliminary and exploratory, open to further comment and expansion. Nevertheless, I hope 
that it will prove worthwhile to at least begin contemplating the practical implications of the 
above theoretical analysis. In this spirit, I will consider the proper impact of resulting harm in 
two areas: namely, offence definitions and decisions to criminalise. 
Of course, in considering these two areas I must inevitably neglect other contexts in 
which resulting harm can and does make a difference to criminal liability. Most obviously, I 
neglect to discuss liability to punishment.53 This is regrettable, as punishment is the context 
in which the issues surrounding the justice of criminal liability for resulting harm are most 
                                                 
53 There are also other less obvious but nevertheless significant ways in which resulting harm might influence 
criminal liability: for example, through police and prosecutorial decision-making. 
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vividly illustrated. However, both the justification of punishment and the criteria for its 
apportionment are notoriously difficult and contested topics.54 Because of this, it is difficult 
to say much about how resulting harm should affect punishment that readers of different 
theoretical inclinations would agree upon. Punishment is therefore a more apt question to 
leave aside here than offence definitions or criminalisation decisions. I take this option in the 
hope that doing so will not prejudice the remainder of this paper. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, let us turn first to offence definitions. What conclusions 
can we draw from our discussion so far about how resulting harm might legitimately affect 
these? First, recall that there is no inherent moral objection to attributing harms to those 
agents that cause them. Second, we have just seen that the state also has good reason to 
impose liability for causing harm, because of what this communicates to offenders, victims 
and the public. One way in which the state can make liability sensitive to harm is to attribute 
that harm to offenders by convicting them of causing it, as well as of acting culpably. This 
requires including harm in the definition of offences. For example, the state might create 
distinct offences of dangerous driving and causing death by dangerous driving, or of assault 
and manslaughter. 
As we saw in part two above, considerations of justice seem to militate in favour of 
such an approach. However, we have also encountered a potential injustice associated with 
it: namely, the unjust societal treatment to which the state may expose those who it convicts 
of causing harm. Following the observations made in part one, it may not trouble us that the 
driver who causes harm is labelled as a killer. As we saw there, this is simply a reflection of 
the consequences that are attributable to her; it does not entail any judgement about her 
culpability. However, the state cannot hope to educate citizens in such fine points of moral 
theory. Because of the independent motivation for anger that the occurrence of harm 
provides, citizens may therefore unreflectively judge that the driver who kills is more culpable 
because of the harm that she has caused, and treat her accordingly. By including harm within 
offence definitions, the state risks encouraging such behaviour. 
                                                 
54 For overviews of suggested principles of punishment, see RA Duff and D Garland (eds), A Reader on 
Punishment (Oxford: OUP, 1994); HLA Hart, ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’ in his Punishment 
and Responsibility (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP, 2008); N Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and 
Community Values (London: Routledge, 1988) ch 2. 
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In choosing whether or not to include harm in offence definitions, the state is 
therefore faced with a choice between two possible injustices. On the one hand, by excluding 
harm, it fails to include morally significant information in its communications about criminal 
cases. On the other, by including harm, it risks exposing those offenders who cause harm to 
unjust treatment by their peers. Which option the state should choose will thus depend on 
which injustice is the least grave. We can expect this to vary from case to case. For instance, 
the kind of treatment that an intentional killer will receive when convicted of murder may not 
seem gravely unjust, particularly when compared to the likely treatment of attempted 
murderers. By contrast, we will probably be concerned about the fate of the ‘one-punch killer’ 
who is convicted of a homicide offence, compared to those who are convicted of similarly 
culpable assaults. 
How might we explain the intuitive difference between these two cases? One possible 
explanation concerns the extent to which the respective offenders had adequate 
opportunities to avoid the excessive blame that the attribution of harm precipitates. Liability 
to such negative consequences – and thus also the inclusion of harm within offence 
definitions – is more easily justifiable to the extent that one had such opportunities. Generally 
speaking, offenders who are guilty of attacks might easily have avoided having resulting 
harms attributed to them. This is because attacks are, by definition, intended to cause harm.55 
Assuming that we are generally capable of choosing autonomously, it is thus ordinarily easy 
to avoid liability for harmful attacks; one can simply choose not to act in this way. Murderers 
come into this category. They are successful attackers. We may therefore feel that exposing 
them to excessive blame by attributing harm to them is not gravely unjust, for they chose to 
bring that harm about.  
We can contrast attacks with endangerments. Unlike attacks, endangerments merely 
expose people to risks of harm; they are not aimed at causing it. Indeed, one might 
conceivably endanger another whilst desiring not to harm that other. Because of this feature, 
an offender’s chance to avoid liability for endangered harm will often be inadequate. For 
example, consider the one-punch killer. Although this offender attacks his victim’s bodily 
integrity, he only endangers with respect to the victim’s life. He may not even contemplate 
the possibility that death might result from his actions. As such, an offence that potentially 
                                                 
55 On the distinction between attacks and endangerments, see RA Duff, Answering for Crime (Oxford: Hart, 
2007) ch 7. 
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imposes liability for death as a result of any endangerment of bodily integrity – such as the 
current English manslaughter offence – may not present a fair chance to avoid liability for that 
harm. Such provisions make offenders liable to be treated as culpable killers by their peers 
even when they choose only some less harmful course of action.  
Several factors will make a difference to our judgements of the fairness of offences of 
harmful endangerment. For example, how foreseeable must the risks imposed by the 
prohibited conduct be? And to what extent are defendants required to be aware of these 
risks? In English law, one need only act in a way which a reasonable person would be aware 
carries a risk of some harm in order to be guilty of manslaughter, if that conduct is unlawful 
and results in death.56 Most will agree that such an offence does not give actors a fair chance 
to avoid being treated as a culpable killer. However, the precise limits of this sentiment are 
unclear. Must all elements of harm in the definitions of endangerment offences be 
accompanied by culpability requirements in order to be fair? If so, what level of culpability 
should be required? I will not attempt to answer these questions here.57 It will suffice to say 
for the moment that, in contrast to offences prohibiting attacks, offences prohibiting harmful 
endangerment will often raise concerns of fairness regarding the societal treatment to which 
they expose offenders. 
We can turn now to criminalisation decisions. I argued above that the state has reason 
to make criminal liability sensitive to resulting harm. Given that the criminalisation of conduct 
is a necessary condition of criminal liability for that conduct, might resulting harm legitimately 
influence decisions to criminalise? Again, the discussion so far suggests that it might. In part 
two above, I argued that the class of cases in respect of which a re-affirmation of victims’ 
claims may be due coincides – albeit not perfectly – with the class of cases in which harm 
occurs. Because the criminal law cannot play its role in confirming the moral worth of victims 
unless the conduct concerned is criminalised, there is thus often an additional reason to 
criminalise harmful behaviour. 
                                                 
56 Church [1965] 2 All ER 72 CCA. The Law Commission’s most recent proposals would improve on this only 
slightly, requiring a defendant to be ‘aware’ that his conduct ‘involved a serious risk of causing some injury’: 
Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006). 
57 For consideration of the view that harm elements of criminal offences should always be accompanied by 
corresponding mental elements, see J Horder, ‘A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law’ 
[1995] Crim LR 759. 
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As promised above, I will now go into a little more detail about the relationship 
between harm and the need to re-affirm the claims of victims. Once again, it will be helpful 
to distinguish here between attacks and endangerments. Consider attacks first. Recall that 
attacks are those actions which are intended to cause harm. By their very nature, attacks will 
thus usually have specific victims (or at least specific targets) even when they do not result in 
harm. As such, the state still has the relevant additional reason to criminalise failed attacks – 
or, in the terminology of the criminal law, attempts. Whilst we have none of the 
corresponding reasons to document harm in attempt cases, we will usually still have reason 
to re-affirm the moral claims of specific persons. 
We can contrast attempts with cases of harmless endangerment. Whilst harmless 
endangerment can sometimes have specific victims, this is not generally the case as it is with 
attempts. For example, consider once more the case of the dangerous driver. When she goes 
round the blind corner, she may endanger a specific pedestrian who narrowly avoids being 
harmed. However, she may endanger only a general class of people: say, ‘people who might 
have been walking on the footpath at the relevant time’. In this latter case, there is no need 
to re-affirm the claims of specific persons and, correspondingly, no additional reason to 
criminalise the driver’s conduct. This suggests that we have no general reason to criminalise 
harmless endangerment of the kind that we have to criminalise attempts. 
Of course, it does not follow from this that the criminalisation of harmless 
endangerment is unjustifiable. However, it does follow that there may be some cases in which 
the occurrence of harm will make a difference to whether some type of endangerment ought 
to be criminalised at all. We have already seen that attacks are autonomously chosen in a way 
that endangerments need not be; thus, offences prohibiting the endangerment of a given 
interest are inherently more difficult to justify than offences prohibiting attacks against that 
interest. Furthermore, harmless endangerment does not generally give rise to a need to re-
affirm the moral claims of victims. The case for criminalising harmless endangerment is 
therefore doubly disadvantaged when compared to the case for criminalising attacks. When 
endangerment results in harm, however, one of these disadvantages is not present. It is thus 
conceivable that harmfulness may prove conclusive in the decision to criminalise such 
conduct. 
There is much more detail to add here. I do not mean to suggest that every token of 
attempted crime is justifiably criminalised, or that we should always be sceptical about 
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criminalising harmless endangerment. Rather, I merely mean to make some general 
observations about these two kinds of offence. Nevertheless, these observations might prove 
important, as the law must inevitably deal to some extent in generalisations. Generally 
speaking, the state has reason to criminalise attempts of a kind that it does not always have 
to criminalise harmless endangerment. This contributes to explaining the current state of 
English criminal law, in which there is no general offence of endangerment that corresponds 
to the general offence of attempt.58 The criminalisation of attempts is generally justifiable, 
because attempts usually have specific victims and the relevant prohibitions do not impact 
greatly on our autonomy. However, neither of these statements is true of harmless 
endangerment. We may therefore do best to continue to approach the criminalisation of such 
conduct on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have explored why and how the state may justifiably impose criminal liability 
for resulting harm. I began by exploring the problem of resultant moral luck, arguing that we 
should distinguish between the attribution and culpability senses of moral blameworthiness. 
I demonstrated that we have no reason to make attribution sensitive to what is within an 
agent’s control, and thus that there can be no inherent objection to attributing to offenders 
the harms that they have caused. I also showed that the best construction of our intuitions 
does not support the subjection of our blaming practices to resultant luck. I then went on to 
argue that the communicative function of the criminal law gives the state reason to attribute 
harms to offenders, because of what doing so communicates to those offenders, as well as to 
victims and the general public. Regarding the latter two, I argued that justice may even 
compel such communication. Finally, I tentatively explored precisely how resulting harm 
might influence criminal liability in two contexts: offence definitions and criminalisation 
decisions. I argued that it might properly affect both, but that different considerations will 
apply to attacks and endangerments in determining the proper extent of its influence.  
                                                 
58 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1. For an example of a more general offence of reckless endangerment – 
albeit one pertaining only to risks of death and serious injury – see s 211.2 of the American Model Penal Code. 
